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The Merger of Banking and Insurance: Will Congress
Close the South Dakota Loophole?
In recent years, banks have attempted to diversify their finan-
cial services.' Such bank product expansion efforts have encoun-
tered historical and legislative barriers separating banking and
commerce. 2 The current desire of banks to enter the insurance
market illustrates the tension between bank service diversification
and traditional restraints on banking activity.3 Although federal
legislation since the Great Depression has averted a merger of the
banking and insurance industries, Congress recently has been inac-
tive in this area. 4 Capitalizing on Congress' inaction, South Dakota
enacted legislation in March 1983, authorizing South Dakota
chartered banks 5 to engage in "all facets of the insurance indus-
try." 6 In effect, the South Dakota legislation would allow bank
holding companies to circumvent federal banking law, which specif-
ically restricts the insurance activities of all bank holding compa-
nies.7 On January 5, 1984, however, the Federal Reserve Board
1 See, e.g., Saks, Insurance Industry Battles on Federal and State Levels Against Banks Bid to
Market Products, 11 EST. PLAN. 182 (1984); Note, Approval of Citicorp's Application to Extend Data
Services Activites: the Federal Reserve Board's Policies Regarding Nonbanking Activities, 1983 DUKE
L.J. 423 (1983); Note, Avoiding the Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company Acts: An Optionfor
Bank Product Expansion, 59 IND. LJ. 89 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Avoiding Glass-Stea-
gall] (acquisition of a state chartered investment bank affiliate by a federal bank); Hanauer,
A Brave New Worldfor Banking Law, Cal. L., Aug. 1984, at 24 (the creation of the consumer
bank or "nonbank bank").
2 See, e.g., The National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1982); Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-
Steagall Act), 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1982); Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No.
511, ch. 240, § 2, 70 Stat. 133 (1956), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1982); Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469.
3 Hearings on S. 2181 and S. 2134 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 397 (1984) (statement of Frederick S. Hammer, Executive Vice
President, Chase Manhattan Bank).
4 114 CONG. REc. S1i,147 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984) (statement of Senator Pressler);
Langley, FDIC Proposes to Let 14,700 Banks Enter Securities and Other Businesses Via Units, Wall
St. J., Nov. 27, 1984, at 3, col. 2 (noting that proposed FDIC rules would permit state
chartered banks to "enter the insurance, real estate, data-processing, securities and travel
agency businesses").
5 Banks may be chartered by either a state or the federal government. Federally
chartered banks must be members of the Federal Reserve System, and they are insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. State chartered banks may join the Federal
Reserve System; those that do must obtain federal deposit insurance. State chartered banks
that are not members of the Federal Reserve System, however, may also purchase federal
deposit insurance. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30
STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977).
6 S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 51-18-30 (1984).
7 Note, Paving the Way in the Financial Services Industry: South Dakota Opens the Insurance
Industry to Banks, 29 S.D.L. REV. 172 (1984).
("Board") refused to approve proposed acquisitions of South Da-
kota banks by several bank holding companies under this legisla-
tion.8 Instead, the Board suspended the processing of the
applications, awaiting a response from Congress.9
Senate Bill 2851 ("S. 2851"), proposing the Financial Services
Competitive Equity Act, t0 passed by the Senate on September 13,
1984, purported to close the so-called "South Dakota loophole.""l
Specifically, S. 2851 would prohibit, except in certain specified in-
stances, a bank holding company or any subsidiary or affiliate thereof
from providing insurance as a principal, agent, or broker.
12
Although S. 2851 passed the Senate, it died in conference with the
House of Representatives at the close of the 98th Congress.13 On
November 26, 1984, in response to Congress' inaction, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") announced proposed
rules which, if approved, would sanction the South Dakota legisla-
tion by permitting state chartered banks to engage in any insurance
activity authorized by the chartering state.
14
This note addresses the question of bank expansion into the
insurance industry and concludes that the merger of the banking
and insurance industries would be undesirable. Part I reviews the
historical and legislative background surrounding bank product ex-
pansion, depicting a tradition of separating banking and commerce.
Part II discusses the 1983 South Dakota banking legislation as a
paradigm of the challenge to federal banking law mounted by the
states. 15 Finally, Part III reviews S. 2851, the Senate's response to
the proposed entry of banks into the national insurance market
through the acquisition of state chartered banks and the implica-
8 Fed. Res. Bull. 19 (1984). Citicorp was the first bank holding company to take ad-
vantage of the South Dakota banking law. In July 1983, the South Dakota Banking Com-
mission approved Citicorp's bid to acquire at least 80% of the voting shares of the
American State Bank of Rapid City, South Dakota. Bank America Corporation and First
Interstate Bancorp followed Citicorp, each attempting to acquire a South Dakota chartered
bank by September 1983. Note, supra note 7, at 175 n.36.
9 Fed. Res. Bull. 19 (1984).
10 114 CONG. REC. S11,162 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984).
11 114 CONG. REC. S11,146 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). The South Dakota loophole
refers to the assertion that the Garn-St. Germain Act's insurance restrictions do not affect a
bank holding company's state chartered banking subsidiary. See note 64 infra.
12 114 CONG. REC. S11,165 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984) (emphasis added).
13 Any bill that does not pass both houses before the close of that Congress' second
session is discarded. In other words, "[t]he life of a bill is the life of a Congress." W.
KEEFE, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS, CONGRESS AND THE STATES 51 (6th ed. 1985).
14 See note 4 supra.
15 Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin have also considered legislation
expanding the insurance authority of state chartered banks. Wilson, Separation Between
Banking and Commerce Under the Bank Holding Company Act-A Statutory Objective Under Attack, 33
CAmH. U.L. REV. 163, 165 n.8 (1983).
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tions of Congress' failure to enact S. 2851, the Financial Services
Competitive Equity Act.
I. Historical and Legislative Background
The history of American banking is a pattern of legislative and
economic upheavals generally precipitated by military conflicts and
the industry's desire to capitalize on investment opportunities by
circumventing current banking legislation. Before the Civil War,
the American banking system followed the English system 16 which
separated commercial banking from investment or speculative
banking. Investment banking was considered too risky for an insti-
tution entrusted with the public's money.' 7 The post-Civil War pe-
riod presented banks with investment opportunities that challenged
the previously accepted dichotomy between commercial banking
and investment banking.' 8 The banking industry's response was
the trust company, a creature of state corporate law, and therefore
largely immune from restrictive federal and state banking laws. 19
By the turn of the century, the trust company had merged commer-
cial and investment banking, accepting demand deposits from the
general public while promoting and selling securities for corporate
customers.
20
World War I contributed to the merger of commercial and in-
vestment banking by introducing the banking industry to the gov-
ernment bond market. Banks encouraged the purchase of
government bonds through generous repayment plans, and distrib-
uted the bonds to investors. 21 After the war, drawing on their expe-
rience in the government bond market, some commercial banks
entered the investment banking field. 22 This shift away from the
separation of commercial and investment banking accelerated dur-
ing the 1920's, although commercial banks still comprised only a
16 Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING Lj.
483, 485 (1971).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 487.
19 Id. Although the trust company solicited deposits from the public, it was generally
considered beyond the reach of federal banking statutes, particularly the National Bank Act.
Id. at 488.
20 Id. at 488. State and federally chartered banks pressured lawmakers for the freedom
to compete with trust companies. State legislatures responded by providing state chartered
banks with broader investment banking privileges. Congress, however, remained silent,
placing federal banks at a competitive disadvantage. Id. at 488-89. Federal banks reacted
by creating subsidiaries, incorporated under state law, which were free to compete in the
investment banking field. One method federal banks used to establish a subsidiary was to
create a holding company, which owned both the parent bank and the investment banking
affiliate. Thus, the bank holding company concept arose at the turn of the century to facili-
tate bank service diversification. Id. at 489 n.18.
21 Id. at 491.
22 Id.
[Vol. 60:762
small share of the investment banking market.23 Then, in 1927,
Congress passed the McFadden Act which expressly permitted na-
tional banks to enter investment banking,24 and commercial banks
nearly doubled their participation in new bond issuances. 25
The stock market crash of 1929, however, caused a chain of
bank failures, and commercial banks' investment affiliates proved a
prime target for proponents of bank reform.26 Denouncing the
abandonment of financially sound and stable banking for "exces-
sive marginal speculation" and "stock gambling," Senator Carter
Glass led the movement for comprehensive bank reform.27 His ef-
forts culminated in the Banking Act of 193328 ("the Glass-Steagall
Act"), which mandated a return to the total separation of commer-
cial banking and investment banking. 29
This return to the traditional functions of commercial banking
occurred during the midst of the Depression. Confronted with
fierce competition in a tight commercial loan market, national
banks tried to maximize profit opportunities through diversifica-
tion, while at the same time avoiding the Glass-Steagall Act's re-
strictions. The industry turned to the bank holding company.30 By
carefully structuring the bank holding company to prevent its own-
ership of a Federal Reserve member bank and its ability to vote a
member bank's shares, the holding company remained outside the
scope of the Glass-Steagall Act.3 1
23 Id. at 495.
24 McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 639, ch. 191, § 3, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927), amended by 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1982).
25 Perkins, supra note 16, at 495.
26 The highly publicized failure of the Bank of the United States in 1930 introduced
unwary depositors to the abuses of speculative banking practices. The New York bank's
president, Bernard Marcus, misappropriated a substantial amount of the bank's funds,
which he personally invested through the bank's investment affiliates. When the bank
closed its doors, its obligations included over $200 million in deposits. Id. at 497.
27 Id. at 499.
28 Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), ch. 89, § 1, 48 Stat. 162, (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 227 (1982)).
29 The Act provides that "no member bank shall be affiliated with any corporation,
association, business trust, or other similar organization engaged principally in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale or distribution. . . of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes,
or other securities." 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982).
30 Chase, The Emerging Financial Conglomerate: Liberalization of the Bank Holding Company
Act, 60 GEo. LJ. 1225, 1228-29 (1972).
31 The Glass-Steagall Act placed the bank holding company within the Federal Reserve
Board's jurisdiction only if at least one bank in the holding company was a member of the
Federal Reserve system and the holding company attempted to vote its stock in the member
bank. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), ch. 89, § 19, 48 Stat. 186, amended by 12
U.S.C. § 61 (1982). Bank holding companies not regulated by the Federal Reserve Board
were free to engage in nonbanking activities forbidden to federal banks. Chase, supra note
30, at 1230.
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Such bank holding companies flourished from 1933 to 1956.32
This growth, and the corresponding combination of banking and
nonbanking activities, concerned members of Congress.3 3 In 1956,
Congress passed the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, requir-
ing all bank holding companies to divest their nonbanking subsidi-
aries within two years. 34 Significantly, however, the Act specifically
excepted from the divestiture requirement the "shares of any com-
pany all the activities of which are of a financial, fiduciary or insur-
ance nature" which the Federal Reserve Board has "determined to
be so closely related to the business of banking . . . as to be a
proper incident thereto."3 5 Pursuant to this exception, the Federal
Reserve Board permitted certain bank holding companies to en-
gage in the sale of property, casualty insurance, and life insurance.
But underwriting insurance was still prohibited.
36
In 1970, Congress amended the Bank Holding Company Act,
changing the standard which had previously guided the Board's de-
cisions regarding a bank holding company's insurance activities.
37
Specifically, Congress added to the "so closely related to. . . bank-
32 From 1933 to 1956, the number of independent banks decreased by approximately
5,000. Chase, supra note 30, at 1231.
33 Even a bank holding company subject to Federal Reserve Board regulation under
the Glass-Steagall Act was free to combine banking activities with nonbanking activities
other than investment banking. Id. at 1229 n.16. In June 1955, the House Committee on
Banking and Currency reported:
One of the regulated bank holding companies which owns more than 50 percent of
the capital stocks of banks with total deposits of slightly over $2 billion . . . owns
all of the capital stock of a life insurance company. . . with over $5 billion of life
insurance in force . . . in 47 states, 7 Canadian provinces, Hawaii and Alaska and
the District of Columbia. In addition, the holding company owned from 92.5 to
100 percent of the capital stock of four fire and casualty insurance companies
which write practically all forms of insurance other than life.
101 CONG. REC. 8040-41 (1955).
34 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511, ch. 240, § 2, 70 Stat. 133, 135
(1956) amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). Opponents of bank holding company ex-
pansion into nonbanking ventures argued:
1. Multistate bank holding companies were not responsive to the needs of the
public;
2. Bank holding companies were subject to a conflict of interest in executing their
banking and nonbanking functions;
3. Bank holding companies tended to diminish or eliminate competition;
4. Bank holding companies were a means of evading federal and state laws.
Note, The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 9 STAN. L. REV. 333, 334 (1957) (citing Hearings
on S. 76 and S. 1118 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 72
(1953)).
35 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511, ch. 240, § 2, 70 Stat. 133
(1956), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
36 Wilson, supra note 15, at 167. (citing First Bank Stock Corp., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 917
(1959); Bank Shares, Inc., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 954 (1959); General Contract Corp., 44 Fed.
Res. Bull. 260 (1958)).
37 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1982).
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ing"3 8 element a requirement that the proposed insurance activity
be reasonably expected to produce benefits to the public (greater
convenience, increased competition, or efficiency gains) that would
outweigh possible adverse effects (undue concentrations of re-
sources, decreased or unfair competition, conflicts of interest, or
unsound banking practices). 39
During the 1970's, the Board's broad interpretations of the
"closely related/public benefits" test were challenged in court.40
38 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
39 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). Although this conjunctive amendment appeared to
further restrict bank holding company acquisitions, the legislative history and subsequent
Federal Reserve Board decisions proved the contrary. The legislative history supporting
the 1970 "public benefits" amendment to the Act reveals a distinct disagreement between
the House and Senate. Representative Wright Patman, Chairman of the House Conferees
for the bill, stated that the public benefits test was accepted by the conferees in lieu of a
more expansive "functionally related" test. The rejection of the functionally related test,
according to Representative Patman, demonstrated "that the Congress was not convinced
that such expansion and liberalization was justified." 116 CONG. REC. 41,950 (1970). Spe-
cifically, Representative Patman noted that the bill defined permissible bank holding com-
pany acquisitions "in [such] a way that insurance companies or insurance agents cannot be
made a part of a bank holding company." Id. at 41,952.
On the other hand, Senator Sparkman, the Senate's leading conferee, stated that the
addition of the public benefits test "provides that permissible activities may be related to
the business of banking generally, rather than perpetuating the concept that such activities
must be related to the specific business carried on by the subsidiary banks of the particular
holding company." Id. at 42,424. Significantly, both Senators Sparkman and Bennett, in
response to a question from the Senate floor quoting Representative Patman's above-cited
remarks (concerning insurance activities of bank holding companies), explicitly stated that
they disagreed with Representative Patman's interpretation of the conference committee's
intent. Id. at 42,429. Senator Bennett added that the Federal Reserve Board had approved
the insurance activities of bank holding companies for 14 years, "and there was no intent on
the part of the conference committee to overrule these past discussions." Id.
Not surprisingly, the Federal Reserve Board agreed with the Senate's interpretation of
the 1970 amendments. In 1971, the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Y provided that
"acting as insurance agent or broker in offices at which the holding company or its subsidi-
aries are otherwise engaged in business" was closely related to banking as long as the insur-
ance sold was directly related to the extension of credit or the provision of other financial
services by the bank holding company or its subsidiary. 36 Fed. Reg. 15,525 (1971) (codi-
fied as amended at 12 C.F.R. § 225.128 (1984)). In 1971, the Board sanctioned the under-
writing of "credit life insurance and credit accident and health insurance that is directly
related to extensions of credit by the bank holding company system." 37 Fed. Reg. 28,046
(1972) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.135 (1984)).
40 In Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors, 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.
1976), aftd on rehearing, 558 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978), the
court upheld the provision of property damage and liability insurance in connection with
the traditional banking functions of extending credit and providing other financial services
by either a bank or nonbank subsidiary of a bank holding company. But in Florida Ass'n of
Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors, 591 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1979), the court reversed a
Federal Reserve Board order allowing three bank holding companies to sell insurance in
Florida because the Board had ignored "the applicability and effect of state law inasmuch as
it bears upon the public interest determination required by the Act." Id. at 342. See also
Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors, 658 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 664
F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1981); NCNB Corp. v. Board of Governors, 599 F.2d 609 (4th Cir.
1979).
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Although the courts occasionally modified the Board's pronounce-
ments concerning insurance activities of bank holding companies
under this test,41 the decisional law did not clarify the scope of per-
missible activities.
In October 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act 42 ("Garn-St. Germain Act"), expressly prohibiting bank hold-
ing companies from conducting most insurance activities, was en-
acted.43 Specifically, the Garn-St. Germain Act provided that "it is
not closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks for
a bank holding company to provide insurance as a principal, agent
or broker." 44 Thus, as before, 45 Congress sought to separate bank-
ing from other forms of commerce, in this case the underwriting or
sale of insurance. 46 Although the Garn-St. Germain Act's insurance
restrictions clearly extended to federally chartered banks, some
doubt existed as to whether the Act's restrictions covered state
chartered bank holding company subsidiaries. 47 In March 1983,
capitalizing on this uncertainty, South Dakota enacted legislation
expressly permitting its banks to engage in the insurance business.
41 Wilson, supra note 15, at 168.
42 Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469.
43 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
44 Id. The Gam-St. Germain Act excluded from this general prohibition the following:
1. The provision by a bank holding company of credit life, disability and involun-
tary unemployment insurance as underwriter or agent;
2. The provision by a bank holding company's finance subsidiaries of credit prop-
erty insurance on loans not greater than $10,000 ($25,000 if the loan is secured by
a residential manufactured home);
3. The provision by a bank holding company of insurance agency services in places
where the population does not exceed 5,000 or where the bank holding company
demonstrates a lack of adequate insurance agency facilities;
4. Insurance agency activities conducted or approved by the Federal Reserve
Board on or before May 1, 1982;
5. The supervision by a bank holding company of agents who sell fidelity, prop-
erty and casualty, and group employee insurance to the bank holding company;
6. The provision by a bank holding company with total assets not exceeding $50
million of any insurance agency services, subject to the limitation of 1, 2 and 3
above;
7. Any insurance agency activities undertaken by a bank holding company before
January 1, 1971.
Id.
45 Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), ch. 89, § 1, 48 Stat. 162, (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 340 (1933)); Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511, ch. 240, § 2,
70 Stat. 133 (1956), amended by 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1982).
46 As one commentator noted, "[o]ver time, the policy of separation has ebbed and
flowed. But it has been reaffirmed periodically on several occasions in the 20th century."
Shull, The Separation of Banking and Commerce: Origin, Development and Implications for Antitrust,
28 ANTITRUST BULL. 255, 271 (1983).




II. South Dakota's Response to the Garn-St. Germain Act
Less than six months after the enactment of the Garn-St.
Germain Act, South Dakota amended its banking statutes. An ef-
fort to create jobs and attract new business to South Dakota,48 the
new legislation permits a South Dakota bank, "directly or through
subsidiaries, to engage in all facets of the insurance business." 49
Further, the new law allows bank holding companies not presently
conducting banking business in South Dakota to acquire or estab-
lish a South Dakota bank.50 The intended effect of the legislation is
to permit any bank holding company to avoid the Garn-St. Germain
Act's insurance restrictions by acquiring a South Dakota chartered
banking subsidiary. The bank holding company could then market
any insurance product nationwide.
The South Dakota legislation is controversial.51 Proponents of
the South Dakota legislation, contending that the restrictions on in-
surance activity imposed by the Garn-St. Germain Act do not ex-
tend to the state chartered banking subsidiaries of a bank holding
company, base their contention primarily upon two grounds. First,
they note that the restrictive language of section 4(a)(2) of the Bank
Holding Company Act does not refer to a bank holding company's
banking subsidiaries, but rather includes only the bank holding com-
pany itself and its nonbanking subsidiaries.52 Therefore, they argue
that according to ordinary principles of statutory construction,
Congress must have intended to exclude the bank holding com-
pany's banking subsidiaries from the scope of the Act.55
On the other hand, opponents of the South Dakota legislation
48 Wilson, supra note 15, at 169; Note, supra note 7, at 172.
49 S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 51-18-30 (1984).
50 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 51-16-40 (1984).
51 During Senate debate of S. 2851, Senator Gorton observed that "it should be clear
to all members [of the Senate] that it was this action-the authorizing by South Dakota of
nationwide insurance powers ...that gave rise to the controversy." 114 CONG. REC.
S11,139 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). Senator Gorton added "no one wants South Dakota
making banking law for the whole country." Id. See generally Wilson, supra note 15; Note,
supra note 7.
52 "No bank holding company shall. . . retain direct or indirect ownership or control
• ..of any company which is not a bank or bank holding company or engage in any activi-
ties other than. . .banking or of managing or controlling banks. . . and. . . those [activi-
ties] permitted under [Section 4(c)(8)]." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1982).
53 Wilson, supra note 15, at 176. Although not an advocate of the South Dakota legisla-
tion, Senator Gorton, during Senate debate of S. 2851, observed "there is not a great deal
of ambiguity in the language of the statute. . . .[B]ank holding companies may control
nonbanks which meet the Section 4 limitations. . . but no limitation is placed on what a
bank may do." 114 CONG. REC. S11,138 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). Further, Senator Gor-
ton noted that section 4(c)(8), as amended by the Garn-St. Germain Act, provides "it is not
closely related to banking for a bank holding company to provide insurance." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(8) (1982). Significantly, the section of the Act that expressly limits the insurance
activities of bank holding companies does not mention their banking subsidiaries. Id.
1985]
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maintain that "bank holding company" as used in the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act, refers to both the banking and nonbanking com-
ponents of the entity.54 Moreover, critics of the South Dakota
legislation contend that if a bank holding company acquires a state
chartered bank which owns an insurance company, the bank hold-
ing company would have control of a company that is not a bank.55
This, they argue, is a direct violation of section 4(a)(1) of the Bank
Holding Company Act, which provides that "no bank holding com-
pany shall . . .acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of
any. . company which is not a bank."
56
Proponents of the South Dakota banking legislation also cite
Federal Reserve Board Regulation Y, section 225.4(e)(2), which
states:
So far as federal law is concerned, a state chartered bank or a
subsidiary thereof may . . . acquire or retain all . . .of the
shares of a company that engages solely in activities in which the
parent bank may engage, at locations in which the bank may en-
gage in the activity, and subject to the same limitations as if the
bank were engaging in the activity directly.
57
Advocates of the South Dakota legislation contend that this lan-
guage indicates that state law, not federal law, determines the scope
of activities available to state chartered banks. 58 Thus, section
225.4(e)(2) supports the proposition that a state chartered bank
may undertake nonbanking activity subject only to the limitations of
the chartering state's banking law.
54 Wilson, supra note 15, at 176. During Senate debate of S. 2851, Senator Mitchell
remarked:
This much I say unequivocally: At no time during the drafting, explanation,
or discussion of [title VI of the Garn-St. Germain Act] was there any suggestion
that the language now contained in title VI was intended not to apply to the sub-
sidiaries of bank holding companies. It was and is intended to apply to bank hold-
ing companies and their subsidiaries.
114 CONG. REC. S11,142 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984).
55 Id.
56 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(I) (1982).
57 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(e) (1983). After the enactment of the South Dakota banking legis-
lation, the Federal Reserve Board modified § 225.4(e)(2). In 1984, the Board promulgated
§ 225.22(d)(2), which replaces § 225.4(e)(2). Section 225.22(d)(2) provides:
A state chartered bank or its subsidiary may, insofar as federal law is concerned
and without the Board's prior approval. . . acquire or retain all. . . of the securities of
a company that engages solely in activities in which the parent bank may engage, at
locations at which the bank may engage in the activity, and subject to the same
limitations as if the bank were engaging in the activity directly.
12 C.F.R. § 225.22(d)(2) (1984) (emphasis added). Section 225.22(d)(2) is not less sup-
portive of South Dakota's banking legislation than its predecessor, § 225.4(e)(2). To the
contrary, the added language "without the Board's prior approval" appears more favorable
to the South Dakota banking law, because it reinforces the fact that state chartered banks
are, to a large extent, beyond the reach of federal regulators.
58 Wilson, supra note 15, at 178-79.
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This interpretation of section 225.4(e)(2), however, has been
criticized as conferring more freedom on bank holding companies
than Congress intended.59 Section 4(c)(5) of the Bank Holding
Company Act, the statutory underpinning for the Board's section
225.4(e)(2), permits a bank holding company to acquire any
"shares which are of the kinds and amounts eligible for investment
by national banking associations under the provisions of section 24
of this title." 60 But section 2461 has not been construed to allow
national banks to engage in all facets of the insurance industry.
Rather, courts have limited section 24's application to banks acting
as agents, or underwriting credit life and credit disability insur-
ance.6 2 Moreover, when the Board issued section 225.4(e) in 1971,
it indicated that its decision to exclude state chartered banks from
the nonbanking restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act was
influenced by the "absence of evidence that acquisitions by holding
company banks are resulting in evasions of the purposes of the
Act."6 3 Presumably if a bank holding company acquired a South
Dakota bank solely to circumvent federal banking restrictions, the
Board would reexamine this regulation. 64
Congress could not have intended to restrict the insurance ac-
tivities of a bank holding company and its nonbanking subsidiaries
and at the same time permit the states to define the insurance op-
portunities available to the same bank holding company's state
chartered subsidiary. Such an interpretation of congressional in-
59 Id.
60 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (1982).
61 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982). Generally, § 24 limits the undertakings of a national bank to
accepting deposits, making loans and investing in certain government securities. Wilson,
supra note 15, at 178.
62 Wilson, supra note 15, at 178 n.69 (citing Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Heimann,
613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980)).
63 36 Fed. Reg. 9292 (1971).
64 Testifying before the Senate Banking Committee, Federal Reserve Board Chairman
Volcker remarked:
The Federal Reserve in administering the Bank Holding Company Act, has for
years maintained a policy of permitting state chartered bank affiliates of bank hold-
ing companies to engage in any activity such a bank is permitted to engage in
under its state charter. This policy has been premised upon the view that a certain
degree of experimentation and difference in approach among the states is a legiti-
mate and desirable aspect of our dual banking system, and that differences in pow-
ers allowed by states would be acceptable to the extent they would not dominate
established congressional policy. In view of current developments, I believe that
policy should be reviewed to consider whether the result is to undercut the federal
standards set forth in the Bank Holding Company Act, particularly when the wider
powers might clearly be exercised largely beyond the borders of the state provid-
ing the authority.
Hearings on Problems, Options and Issues Currently Facting the Financial Industry Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1983). But see note 58
supra and accompanying text.
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tent fails to recognize that the bank holding company, together with
its banking and nonbanking affiliates, is a single enterprise, existing
pursuant to federal banking law. 65 Notwithstanding the debate
over the legality of the South Dakota banking legislation, however,
the South Dakota law challenged the federal government's domain
over the bank holding company. In response, the Senate passed S.
2851, the Financial Services Competitive Equity Act.
66
III. S. 2851-The Financial Services Competitive Equity Act
On September 13, 1984, the Senate passed S. 2851, the Finan-
cial Services Competitive Equity Act, which purported to close the
"South Dakota loophole" by explicitly extending the Garn-St.
Germain Act's insurance restrictions to all state chartered bank
holding company subsidiaries. 67 S. 2851 was "designed to clarify
and revise the statutory framework under which financial institu-
tions operate and compete,"68 and represented comprehensive
banking legislation incorporating eight other Senate banking bills
proposed over a fifteen-month period.69 Although S. 2851 would
have placed the bank holding company, and its state chartered affil-
iates, squarely within the bounds of federal banking law, the bill
died in conference at the close of the 98th Congress. 70 Neverthe-
less, the Senate's decision to extend the Garn-St. Germain Act's in-
surance restraints to state chartered bank holding company
affiliates was prudent for three reasons.
First, because the bank holding company is a creature of fed-
eral law, subject to its attendant benefits and drawbacks, it should
65 See notes 71-77 infra and accompanying text.
66 S. 2851, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REC. S1,162 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984).
67 Specifically, S. 2851 would have changed § 4(c)(8) by replacing "it is not closely re-
lated to banking or managing or controlling banks for a bank holding company to provide
insurance" with "it is not closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks for a
bank holding company or any subsidiary or affiliate thereof to provide insurance." S. 2851, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG. REC.-Sli,165 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984) (emphasis added).
Also, S. 2851 would have amended § 7 of the Bank Holding Company Act by providing that
"a state-chartered bank subsidiary of a bank holding company may not engage in activities
or make investments outside the state where it is chartered unless those activities are per-
mitted under Section 4(c) of this Act." Id. at S 11,166.
68 S. REP. No. 560, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984).
69 Id. at 7-8. S. 2851 was created by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs ("Senate Banking Committee") on June 27, 1984. The bill was essentially a
revised version of S. 2181, a bill introduced by Senator Garn, Chairman of the Senate Bank-
ing Committee. S. 2181 had incorporated seven other Senate bills which addressed topics
including the definition of the term "bank," interstate regional banking agreements, usury
preemption, and credit card fraud. The application of the Gan-St. Germain Act's insur-
ance activity restrictions to banking subsidiaries of bank holding companies was added to S.
2851 by the Senate Banking Committee on June 27, 1984. Id. at 8.
70 See note 13 supra.
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be regulated by Congress. 71 Since certain structural and regulatory
advantages encourage a state chartered bank to become a bank
holding company or bank holding company affiliate, 72 the Senate
concluded that a bank holding company may not concurrently ac-
cept these benefits and avoid federal restrictions by embracing
favorable state law. 73 One significant purpose of the dual system of
federal and state bank regulation supports the Senate's conclu-
sion.74 The dual system is useful because it enables a commercial
bank to select the regulatory structure under which it will operate.7 5
Essentially, differences between the competing regulatory schemes,
discernible to the commercial banker, make the dual banking sys-
tem viable. 76
The South Dakota banking legislation threatens the dual bank-
ing system because it permits a South Dakota chartered bank to
merge the competing regulatory structures. Under the South Da-
kota law, a South Dakota chartered bank would obtain the benefits
of affiliation with a national bank holding company while marketing
any insurance product nationwide, consequently avoiding federal
bank holding company insurance restrictions. Thus, a South Da-
kota chartered bank would operate within both federal and state
regulatory structures instead of choosing one regulatory scheme.
Permitting state chartered banks to market insurance in any state
under a hybrid scheme of favorable federal and state legislation is
contrary to the dual banking system. 77
71 114 CONG. REC. SI1,141, S11,143, S11,146-47 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). S. 2851
did not limit the insurance activities of a state chartered bank not affiliated with a bank
holding company.
72 Id. at S11,141 (Senator Dodd's reference to "tax advantages"); id. at S11,143 (Sena-
tor Mitchell's reference to "tax and branching opportunities not available outside the hold-
ing company structure"); id. at S1,147 (Senator Heinz' reference to an "Edge Act
Corporation," described at 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-631 (1982)).
73 Id. at S11,142, Sl1,143, S1l,147.
74 See note 5 supra. Although the dual system of banking regulation has occasionally
been criticized, the following observation represents the more typical view: "The dual
banking system. . . is a vital national goal with roots deep in our constitutional history, and
one of the very reasons why this country has achieved an economic growth unparalleled
among the nations of the world." Scott, supra note 5, at 1 (citing Hearings on the Operation of
the National and Federal Reserve Banking System Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
72d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, at 395 (1932)).
75 Scott, supra note 5, at 8. For example, a state chartered bank may evaluate the bene-
fits and detriments of membership in the Federal Reserve System according to its organiza-
tional goals and choose to accept or decline Federal Reserve membership. Id. at 13. A
commercial bank, in most instances, may also change its charter from state to federal and
vice versa. Id. at 9-12.
76 Id. at 13.
77 During debate of S. 2851, Senator Heinz remarked: "It is not in the interest of a safe
and sound banking system to have a patchwork quilt of laws which permit different holding
companies to engage in different activities, based solely on where the bank is located." 114
CoNe. REC. S 11,146 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). Federal Reserve Board Chairman Volcker
has cautioned against "widely divergent and inconsistent laws. . . with deposit-taking or-
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The second reason to reaffirm the separation of the banking
and insurance industries follows from the recognition that almost
all state chartered banks are insured by the FDIC.78 Because a bank
holding company is not insulated from the misfortunes of its sub-
sidiaries, 79 a state chartered bank's failure in the national insurance
market could threaten the stability of the parent holding com-
pany. 0 If the insurance subsidiary's failure rendered either the
subsidiary or the bank holding company unable to meet its obliga-
tions, federal deposit insurance would protect the claims of deposi-
tors.8 1 Because the ultimate responsibility for the solvency of all
federally insured bank holding company subsidiaries rests with the
federal government, not the chartering states, S. 2851 prudently
extended the Garn-St. Germain Act's insurance restrictions to a
bank holding company's state chartered subsidiaries.
8 2
This argument implicitly recognizes that a large bank holding
company serves sophisticated national and international investors,
acutely cognizant of the bank holding company's stability. These
investors could perceive the failure of a bank holding company's
national insurance subsidiary as a challenge to the stability of the
entire holding company. Federal banking policy since the Depres-
sion, however, has sought to minimize bank failures, responding to
public demand for a fundamentally safe banking structure.83 A
ganizations shopping for the most permissive rules, and states competing to pass such laws
in order to enhance local employment." Hearings on S. 2181 and S. 2134 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 165 (1983) (statement of
Gerald K. Cassidy, President, National Association of Casualty & Surety Agents (quoting
Mr. Volcker's unpublished letter to the Delaware Insurance Commissioner)).
78 In 1980, of the 53,649 commercial banks in this country, only 478 did not have fed-
eral deposit insurance. Note, Avoiding Glass-Steagall, supra note 1, at 91 n.16 (citing U.S.
DEPT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1981, 519 (102d ed. 1981)).
79 Hearings on Problems, Options and Issues Currently Facing the Financial Industry Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1983) (state-
ment of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
80 114 CONG. REC. S11,142 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984).
81 Id.
82 Id. at SlI,141, Sl1,147.
83 The recent reorganization of Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. demon-
strates the FDIC's desire to avoid the harm to the banking industry associated with the
failure of a large bank holding company. Significantly, the source of Continental's demise
was not a nonbanking activity such as the underwriting and marketing of insurance prod-
ucts. Rather, the bank's plight originated in its energy lending division, an endeavor clearly
within the range of permissible banking activities as defined in the Bank Holding Company
Act. The Continental reorganization nonetheless illustrates the substantial premium the
federal government places on a stable banking structure. In May 1984, international inves-
tors believed rumors that Continental would soon fail, unable to sustain reported substan-
tial increases in problem loans. (The 1984 first quarter increase in problem loans was $400
million, bringing the total to $2.3 billion.) An unprecedented run on Continental's depos-
its ensued. Continental borrowed billions from the FDIC, the Federal Reserve System and
other banks to meet its obligations to depositors. By the end of July, the FDIC concluded
[Vol. 60:762
bank's use of FDIC protection as a hedge against failure in competi-
tive nonbanking markets, however, is inconsistent with the objec-
tives of federal deposit insurance.8 4 Furthermore, to attain the
optimum allocation of resources in a competitive market, financial
markets must remain free to bestow success and impose failure
upon competitors. A large bank holding company's failure, how-
ever, would most likely be averted by government intervention.
Thus, a bank holding company's entry into the national insurance
market with a federal guarantee against failure clashes with free
market principles.85
The third reason to explicitly extend the Garn-St. Germain
Act's insurance restrictions to state chartered bank holding com-
pany subsidiaries is to prevent "tie-in" sales of insurance and bank-
ing services.86 Although federal banks and bank holding companies
that a merger or sale of Continental was not feasible, principally due to Continental's size.
Therefore, the FDIC purchased for $3.5 billion loans valued on Continental's books at $4.5
billion, by assuming Continental's debt to the Federal Reserve System. In addition, the
FDIC paid $1 billion for two series of preferred stock, one of which is convertible into 80%
of Continental's common stock. In all, the FDIC invested $4.5 billion in Continental to
avert the failure of the then ninth largest bank holding company. See Bailey, Anatomy of
Failure, Continental Illinois: How Bad Judgments and Big Egos Did It In, Wall St. J.,July 30, 1984,
at 1, col. 6; Bailey, U.S. Pledges More Aid if Necessary For Survival of Continental Illinois, Wall St.
J., July 27, 1984, at 3, col. 1.
84 In Doherty v. United States, 94 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 658 (1938),
the court noted that "Congress created a scheme for insuring to a limited extent the depos-
its of the banks participating in the plan for insurance for the manifest purpose of stabiliz-
ing or promoting the stability of banks, and to aid the government in its evergrowing
financial transactions." Id. at 497. Earlier, in Weir v. United States, 92 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 761 (1937), the court observed: "In pursuance of this power of protec-
tion and preservation, Congress has created, as an agency of the government, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation to promote the soundness of banking and aid the govern-
ment in the discharge of its fiscal transactions." Id. at 636.
85 Hearings on S. 2181 and S. 2134 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1983) (statement of Richard S. Schweiker, President,
American Council of Life Insurance).
86 114 CONG. REc. Sl1,149 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). Generally, a tie-in sale is an
agreement between a buyer and seller such that the seller agrees to sell his product to the
buyer only if the buyer purchases a different product or service. Federal banks and bank
holding companies are expressly prohibited from entering into most tying arrangements.
12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1982). A 1977 Federal Reserve Board study, however, determined that
about 25% of all customers who purchase credit life insurance felt that the purchase was
either "strongly recommended" or "required." Despite this finding, the Federal Reserve
Board study concluded that explicit contractual tying was "virtually nonexistent and im-
plicit tying did not appear to be a widespread problem." Hearings on Tie-ins of the Sale of
Insurance by Banks and Bank Holding Companies Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1979). The Federal Reserve Board study's conclu-
sion has been challenged as inconsistent with the data presented in the study. Id. at 301,
302 (statement of EmmettJ. Vaughn, Professor of Insurance, University of Iowa). In addi-
tion, Lewis Goldfarb, Assistant Director for Credit Practices of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's Bureau of Consumer Protection, stated that "the study's findings are inconsistent
with our experience." Id. at 93. Mr. Goldfarb also remarked that the study "does not sup-
port the conclusion that tying of insurance to credit is not widespread in consumer credit
markets." Id. at 94.
1985] NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
are prohibited from engaging in coercive tie-in sales,87 voluntary
tying arrangements are beyond federal regulation. 88 The Senate
concluded that the potential for voluntary tie-in sales of insurance
products in the banking industry, and the difficulties attendant to
regulating this conduct, outweighed the benefits of diversifying
bank services.
8 9
The Senate's conclusion is supported by the findings of prior
Senate investigations. 90 Moreover, a loan applicant, typically at a
bargaining disadvantage with the bank, may reasonably conclude
that his willingness to purchase additional bank services, such as
credit life insurance or property and casualty insurance, could im-
prove the likelihood of obtaining the loan on more favorable terms.
By eliminating the borrower's incentive to investigate other insur-
ance alternatives, his decision to purchase insurance is swayed sig-
nificantly by factors not pertinent to a free market decision. 9'
S. 2851 properly extended the Garn-St. Germain Act's insur-
ance restrictions to state chartered bank holding company affiliates.
S. 2851 preserved the commercial bank's freedom to choose one
regulatory structure within the dual banking system by prohibiting
a bank holding company from operating within both federal and
various state regulatory schemes. Furthermore, the bill recognized
that because the vast majority of state chartered bank holding com-
pany affiliates are federally insured, their nonbanking activities
should coincide with federal banking policy objectives. The FDIC
has expressed its willingness to permit a state chartered bank to
engage in any insurance activity authorized by the chartering state.
Congress must therefore act to prevent the potential merger of the
87 12 U.S.C. § 1972 (1982).
88 114 CONG. REC. S11,149 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). The following testimony of for-
mer Assistant Attorney General Richard McLaren during the Senate hearings on the 1970
Bank Holding Company Act amendments illustrates the concept of a voluntary tying
arrangement.
[A] potential borrower might place his casualty insurance business with a bank-
affiliated insurer in the hope that such action would improve his chance of the
bank granting him a mortgage loan on the insured premises on favorable terms.
This would have the same effect as a coercive tie-in: competition in the tied prod-
uct (i.e., insurance) would be lessened to the extent that customers no longer
purchased it entirely on its own economic merit.
Hearings on Bank Holding Company Amendments before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1969).
89 114 CONG. REC. S 11,149 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984). Banking commentators contend,
however, that competitive forces within the banking and insurance industries would prevent
voluntary tie-ins. A customer confronted with a coercive tie-in would seek another credit
source. Hearings on S. 2181 and S. 2134 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 438 (1984) (statement Frederick S. Hammer, Executive Vice
President, Chase Manhattan Bank).
90 See notes 86, 88 supra.
91 114 CONG. REC. S1i,149 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1984).
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banking and insurance industries. Accordingly, Congress should
enact legislation similar to S. 2851, prohibiting the interstate mar-
keting of insurance by state chartered bank holding company
subsidiaries.
IV. Conclusion
The American banking system, by law and custom, has been
segregated from other forms of commerce. Congress has included
insurance among the commercial ventures forbidden to the bank-
ing industry, concluding that the risks to the stability and sound-
ness of the banking structure associated with underwriting and
marketing insurance overshadow the societal benefits derived from
more diversified bank services. The ownership of a state chartered
bank, accountable to the chartering state's legislature, by a federally
regulated bank holding company, has challenged Congress'
determination.
In 1983, South Dakota enacted legislation authorizing its banks
to engage in any form of insurance enterprise nationwide. The ap-
parently incongruous assertion that Congress intended to regulate
bank holding companies and their nonbanking subsidiaries, but not
their banking subsidiaries, has proved convincing to FDIC officials.
On November 26, 1984, the FDIC proposed rules that would allow
state chartered banks, if permitted by state law, to underwrite insur-
ance as long as the insurance operation is conducted through a
"bona fide" subsidiary. 92
The Senate response to South Dakota's legislation was S.
2851, the Financial Services Competitive Equity Act. S. 2851 ex-
pressly prohibited any bank holding company's state chartered
banking subsidiary from providing insurance services beyond those
authorized for member banks. Because S. 2851 died in conference,
however, the FDIC appears willing to remove the barriers between
a bank holding company's state chartered banking subsidiaries and
the insurance industry. Consequently, the dual system of federal
and state bank regulation is threatened. If the decision to merge
banking and insurance nationwide is motivated by a particular
state's desire to createjobs, no comprehensive federal banking plan
will survive. Congress, as it has done before, 93 should preserve the
separation between banking and other commercial activities, in-
92 Langley, supra note 4.
93 Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1982), Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511, ch. 240, § 2, 70 Stat. 133, amended by 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841 (1982); Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320,
96 Stat. 1469.
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cluding the underwriting or sale of most insurance, by enacting the
Financial Services Competitive Equity Act.
94
Thomas E. Lange
94 Testifying before the Senate Committee on Banking, Mr. Volcker noted:
We, at the Board, in view of existing law and expressions of congressional intent,
have indicated that we could not approve the acquisition of state chartered banks
by bank holding companies with the apparent intent of undertaking, under rele-
vant state law, widespread insurance activities, beyond the state in which the bank
is chartered. This is one illustration of the urgent need for congressional direction
in setting appropriate guidelines.
Hearings on S. 2181 and S. 2134 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1984).
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